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Abstract
The main aim of our paper is to show that interpretative issues
belonging to classical General Relativity (GR) might be preliminary
to a deeper understanding of conceptual problems stemming from on-
going attempts at constructing a quantum theory of gravity. Among
such interpretative issues, we focus on the meaning of general covari-
ance and the related question of the identity of points, by basing our
investigation on the Hamiltonian formulation of GR. In particular, we
argue that the adoption of a peculiar gauge-fixing within the canoni-
cal reduction of ADM metric gravity may yield a new solution to the
debate between substantivalists and relationists, by suggesting a ter-
tium quid between these two age-old positions. Such a third position
enables us to evaluate the controversial relationship between entity
realism and structural realism in a well-defined case study. After hav-
ing indicated the possible developments of this approach in Quantum
Gravity, we discuss the structuralist and holistic features of the class
of spacetime models that are used in the above mentioned canonical
reduction.
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1 Introduction: two strands of philosophy of
physics that ought to be brought together
In recent philosophy of science, there have been two interesting areas of
research that, independently of each other, have tried to overcome what was
beginning to be perceived as a sterile opposition between two contrasting
philosophical stances.
The first area of research involves the age-old opposition between the so-
called spacetime substantivalism, according to which spacetime exists over
and above the physical processes occurring in it, and relationism, according to
which spatio-temporal relations are derivative and supervenient on physical
relations obtaining among events and physical objects. The plausible claim
that substantivalism and relationism, as they were understood before the
advent of relativity or even before the electromagnetic view of nature, simply
do not fit in well within the main features of the general theory of relativity, is
reinforcing the need of advancing a tertium quid between these two positions,
which tries in some sense to overcome the debate by incorporating some
claims of both sides (Dorato 2000).
On the second front, discussions fuelled by the historical work of Thomas
Kuhn, have generated a contrast between those who believe that assuming
the approximate truth of scientific theories is the best explanation for the
predictive and explanatory success of science - the scientific realists - and
those who insist that the history of science is so replete with the corpses of
abandoned entities (the flogiston, the caloric, the ether, etc.) that one should
believe only in the humanly-observable consequences of our best scientific
theories - the instrumentalists. As an attempt to overcome this opposition
and save the history of science from a complete incommensurability between
successive theories, John Worrall (Worrall , 1989) has recently recuperated
some forgotten lesson left to us by Poincare´, by pointing out that structural
realism (i.e., belief in the relational content denoted by our mathematically-
expressed laws of nature) is ”the best of all possible worlds”. While giving
some content to the view that there is (structural) continuity in the history
of science, and therefore justifying a claim typically endorsed by the realists,
structural realism a´ la Worrall was also meant as a warning against believing
in non directly observable physical entities. Discussing the example already
put forth by Poincare´, Worrall remarked that while Fresnel’s equations were
later incorporated by Maxwell’s synthesis, the ether-based models used by
him to mathematically describe light have later been abandoned.
In this paper, we aim to bring together these two strands of philosoph-
ical research by claiming that a certain form of structural spacetime real-
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ism (a view that we refer to as ”point-structuralism”) may offer the desired
tertium-quid solution to the debate between substantivalists and relationists
by simply overcoming it. As we will see, such a solution emerges naturally
from a certain approach to the Hamiltonian formulation of the general theory
of relativity (GR), which is important not just to shed light on the above
debate but also to clarify - with the help of a well-defined case study - some
philosophical problems that are currently affecting the literature on struc-
tural realism in general. Most importantly, taking a stance on the meaning
of general covariance within classical GR seems to us a precondition also to
develop a satisfactory quantum theory of gravity 1.
Given these aims, our paper is organized as follows. In the next section
(2), we try to clarify the relationships among the various forms of scientific
realism that are currently discussed in the philosophical literature. Together
with the question of clarifying the nature of a physical (versus a purely
mathematical) structure, we believe that these issues are a precondition to
understand the impact of structural realism on the issue of the identity of
point-events in classical GR. After a brief review of the hole argument in
3.1, in 3.2 we show how a peculiar gauge-fixing in the canonical reduction of
ADM metric gravity, based upon a new use of the so-called Bergmann-Komar
”intrinsic pseudo-coordinates”, can help us to formulate a new structural
view of certain models of classical, general relativistic spacetime. In 4, we
indicate some possible developments of this view on the status of ”points” in
Quantum Gravity. In 5 and 5.1 we draw some philosophical conclusions from
the preceding discussion by showing how our point structuralism represents
an overcoming of both traditional substantialist and relationist views of the
spacetime of GR. Such a point structuralism, however, does not dissolve
physical entities into mathematical structures, as it entails a typical ”entity-
realist” attitude toward both the metric field and its ”point-events”, as well
as a theory-realist attitude toward Einstein’s field equations.
2 Many ”Realisms” or one?
With the progressive sophistication of our philosophical understanding of
science, the issue of scientific realism seems to have undergone a process of
complication that is not unlike the growth of a living cell or the development
of an embryo. As evidence for this claim, note that nowadays there are at
least four different ways of characterizing scientific realism, namely theory
realism, entity realism, and more recently, structural scientific realism, where
1See also Belot and Earman (1999).
4
the latter characterization, in its turn, has originated a division between the
so-called epistemic structural realists and the ontic structural realists.
In synthesis, a theory realist defends the claim that the theories of a ma-
ture science and its laws are true in the limits of the approximation of a phys-
ical model or, in short, approximatively true (whatever ”approximately” may
mean in this context, a difficult problem that here we will not address). En-
tity realists claim that entities that are not directly observable with the naked
eye (quarks, electrons, atoms, molecules, etc.) exist in a mind-independent
fashion. Structural realists claim, with Poincare´, that while real objects will
always be hidden from our eyes, ”the true relations between these objects are
the only reality we can attain”: ”...les rapports veritable entre ces objects
sont la seule re´alite´ que nous puissions atteindre” (Poincare´ 1905, p. 162).
One may wonder whether these various forms of realism are logically
independent of each other, as many philosophers have claimed. We believe
that they are not. For example, it is not at all clear whether it is really
possible, pace Hacking (1983), to defend any form of entity realism without
also endorsing some form of theory realism 2.
Analogously, it is highly controversial whether one may have structural
realism without also embarking theory realism or entity realism of some form.
For a necessarily brief defence of the implication from structural realism
to theory realism, consider the following remark. If: (i) the only reality
we can know (as the epistemic structural realist has it) are the relations
instantiated by existing but unknowable entities described by mathematically
expressed laws (Worrall (1989), see also Morganti, forthcoming); and, (ii)
the relations expressed by the equations of mathematical physics represent
the only element of continuity across scientific revolutions; then clearly one
must assume, together with Poincare´, that at least such equations are true
(”les e´quations diffe´rentielle sont toujours vraie”: Poincare´ (1905) ibid.). To
the extent that realism about laws entails theory realism, Poincare´’s and
Worrall’s position seem to presuppose a form of realism about theories, an
implication that in the philosophical literature has gone strangely unnoticed.
For a defence of the implication from structural realism to entity real-
ism, suppose with the ontic structural realists that the relations referred
to by mathematically formulated laws are knowable just because they ex-
hausts what exists, so that entity realism is false. Alternatively, suppose
with the epistemic structural realism that entity realism is epistemically un-
warranted. In both cases, how can we endorse the existence of relations
2For a forceful defense of the view that unless we trust theoretical laws, we cannot
choose between alternative explanations of the data in terms of rival models of theoretical
entities, see Massimi (forthcoming)
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without also admitting the existence of something that such relations relate
(their relata), namely something carrying intrinsic, non-relational proper-
ties?3. Chakravartty (1998) and Cao (2003b), for instance, agree with the
epistemic realist that our knowledge about unobservable entities is essen-
tially structural, but refuse to dissolve physical entities into mathematical
structure, thereby classifying themselves as entity realists, and endorsing the
view that structural realism entails entity realism.4 This is also the view
we want to defend by considering the case study of the ontological status of
points-events in classical GR: point-events are structurally individuated by
the metric field, but (i) the metric field exists as an extended entity and (ii)
the law governing its behavior must be regarded as approximately true.
2.1 What, exactly, is a physical structure?
It should be clear at this point that a decisive progress on the issues con-
cerning structural realism presuppose a clarification of the following, crucial
question: ”what, exactly, is a physical structure ?” As we will see, such a
question is also crucial to address the problem of the nature of point-events
in classical GR. Much seem to depend on how we want to understand a struc-
ture in physical terms, since for our purpose the definition of a mathematical
structure can be taken as sufficiently clear, at least if the latter is regarded
as a system of differential equations plus some abstract object purporting to
describe a physical system.
The problem is that it seems very difficult even to define a physical struc-
ture without bringing in its constituents, and thereby granting them exis-
tence. We will take this difficulty as a preliminary argument in favor of the
implication that we want to defend, namely that structural realism implies
entity realism, let alone theory realism.
For instance, if we preliminarily regard a structure as ”a stable system of
relations among a set of constituents”, i.e., a class of entities (see Cao, 2003a,
pp. 6-7; Cao, 2003b, pp.111) – where ”entities” is deliberately left sufficiently
vague in order to cover cases in which the members of the above class lack
individuality as it is the case for quantum particles – we immediately take
an important stance in the above debate. By adopting this definition in
fact, we are already presupposing the independent existence of entities [the
3This worry has been expressed also by Redhead in private conversation. See French
and Ladyman (2003, p. 41).
4Conversely, it is much less controversial to agree on the fact that a theory realist must
be committed to structural realism about scientific laws, as well as to the existence of
unobservable entities, since holding a theory as approximately true implies believing in the
referential power of its assumptions about unobservable entities.
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constituents], thereby ruling out of the game a priori the ontic structural
realism defended by French and Ladyman (2003)). Analogously, the so-
called ”partial structure approach” (Bueno et.al , 2003a), according to which
a structure is a set of individuals together with a family of partial relations
defined over the set, seems to run an analogous risk, because the definition
of a partial structure includes a set of individuals.
In particular, what is unclear to us is whether it makes sense to consider
a physical, ”holistic structure as [ontologically ] prior to its constituents”, as
Cao has it (Cao , 2003b, p. 111)), by simply arguing that its constituents, ”as
placeholders, derive their meaning or even their existence from their function
and place in the structure.” While the thesis of meaning holism may be un-
controversial but clearly irrelevant in the present ontological discussion, one
must ask how a placeholder can have any ontological function in an evolv-
ing network of relationships without possessing at least some intrinsic non-
relational properties. While we can imagine that placeholders with different
intrinsic properties can contribute the same function in the holistic network,
so that the structural, relational properties empirically underdetermines the
intrinsic properties of the placeholders, it seems that no placeholder can even
have a function without possessing some intrinsic properties5
In a word, we believe that in order to clarify the meaning of ”structure”
in the philosophy of physics in general and in the philosophy of space and
time in particular, it is essential to revert to the original meaning that ”struc-
turalism” had in linguistics or anthropology. In such contexts, structuralism
originally referred to a sort of holistic thesis about the identity of the members
of a set of stable relations, and was not conceived, as today sometimes is, as
an attempt to eliminate the constituents. The crucial question to ask then
becomes: given a certain physical theory, to what extent do the relational
properties of a set of constituents contribute to fix their identity?
In the next section, we will try to answer this question by showing how
the structural and holistic identity of spacetime points in GR does not force
us to abandon the typical entity-realist’s attitude toward the metric field
and its point-events. Such an attitude is compatible with the fact that the
points of a bare manifold, lacking intrinsic identity, are deprived, to put it
with Einstein, of ”the last remnant of physical objectivity”.
5A property is intrinsic or non-relational if and only if its attribution does not presup-
poses the existence of any other entity. For instance, ”being a father” is clearly extrinsic
or relational, while ”being square” is intrinsic.
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3 A case study: the holistic and structural
nature of general-relativistic spacetime in
a class of models of GR
3.1 The Hole Argument and its consequences
In the recent years, the debate on spacetime substantivalism in GR has been
revived by a seminal paper by John Stachel (1980), followed by Earman and
Norton’s philosophical argument against manifold spacetime substantivalism
(1987). Both papers addressed Einstein’s famous Hole Argument (”Loch
Betrachtung”) of 1913-1915 (Einstein (1914, 1916)), which was soon to be
regarded by virtually all participants to the debate6 as being intimately tied
with the nature of space and time, at least as they are represented by the
mathematical models of GR.
In a nutshell, a mathematical model of GR is specified by a four-dimen-
sional mathematical manifold M4 and by a metrical tensor field g, where
the latter dually represents both the chrono-geometrical structure of space-
time and the potential for the inertial-gravitational field. Non-gravitational
physical fields, when they are present, are also described by dynamical tensor
fields, which appear as sources of the Einstein equations.
The above-emphasized dual role of the metric field has recently gener-
ated a conceptual debate, that can be summarized by the following question:
which is the best candidate to interpret the role of space and time in GR,
the manifold or the (manifold plus) the metric? Those opting for the bare
manifoldM4 (like Earman and Norton) correctly point out that g cannot be
understood as interpreting the role of the ”empty spacetime” of the tradi-
tional debate: by embodying the potential of the gravitational field, g is to
be regarded as a (special) type of ”physical field”. Those opting - much more
reasonably, in our opinion - for ”the manifold plus the metric field” (Maudlin
(1990), Stachel (1993)) also correctly point out that the metric provides the
chrono-geometrical structure as well as, most significantly, the causal struc-
ture of spacetime. To the extent that one can see good arguments for both
options - or even if, as we believe, the second option is the only plausible one
- such an ”ambiguous” role of the metric seems to provide one of the main
arguments to claim that the early-modern debate between substantivalists
and relationists is now ”outdated”, because in GR it does not admit of a
clear formulation (Rynasiewicz 1996).
Before agreeing on this skeptical remark, however, it is appropriate to
6For example: Butterfield (1989); Earman (1989); Maudlin (1990); Norton (1987);
Norton (1992, 1993).
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go over the Hole Argument one more time, in order to show how it should
be really tackled and what implications our proposed solution has on the
above debate. Let us assume that M4 contains a hole H: that is, an open
region where all the non-gravitational fields vanish. On M4 we can define
an active diffeomorphism DA (see, for example, Wald (1984)) that re-maps
the points inside H, but blends smoothly into the identity map outside H
and on the boundary. By construction, for any point x ∈ H we have (in the
abstract tensor notation) g′(DAx) = g(x), but of course g′(x) 6= g(x) (in the
same notation). The crucial fact to keep in mind at this point is that the
Einstein equations are generally covariant: this means that if g is one of their
solutions, so is the drag-along field g′ ≡ D∗Ag.
What is the correct interpretation of the new field g′? Clearly, the trans-
formation entails an active redistribution of the metric over the points of the
manifold in H, so the crucial question is whether and how the points of the
manifold are primarily individuated. Now, if we think of the points of H as
intrinsically individuated physical events, where ”intrinsic” means that their
identity is independent of the metric - a claim that is associated with man-
ifold substantivalism - then g and g′ must be regarded as physically distinct
solutions of the Einstein equations (after all, g′(x) 6= g(x) at the same point
x). This is a devastating conclusion for the causality, or better, the deter-
minateness7 of the theory, because it implies that, even after we completely
specify a physical solution for the gravitational and non-gravitational fields
outside the hole - in particular, on a Cauchy surface for the initial value
problem - we are still unable to predict uniquely the physical solution within
the hole. Clearly, if general relativity has to make any sense as a physical
theory, there must be a way out of this foundational quandary, independently
of any philosophical consideration.
According to Earman and Norton (1987), the way out of the hole ar-
gument lies in abandoning manifold substantivalism: they claim that if
diffeomorphically-related metric fields were to represent different physically
possible worlds, then GR would turn into an indeterministic theory. And
since the issue of whether determinism holds or not at the physical level
cannot be decided by opting for a metaphysical doctrine like manifold sub-
stantivalism, they conclude that one should go for spacetime relationism.
Now, if relationism in GR were entailed by the claim that diffeomor-
phically related mathematical models don’t represent physically distinct so-
lutions, most physicists would count themselves as relationists. After all,
7We prefer to avoid the term determinism, because we believe that its metaphysical
flavor tends to overstate the issue at stake. This is especially true if determinism is taken
in opposition to indeterminism, which is not mere absence of determinism.
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the assumption that an entire equivalence class of diffeomorphically related
mathematical solutions represents only one physical solution is regarded as
the most common technical way out of the strictures of the Hole Argument
(in the philosophical literature such an assumption is known, after Earman
and Norton (1987), as Leibniz equivalence). However, we believe that it is not
at all clear whether Leibniz equivalence really grinds corn for the relationist’s
mill, since the spacetime substantivalist can always ask: (1) why on earth
should we identify physical spacetime with the bare manifold deprived of the
metric field? (2) Why should we assume that the points of the mathematical
manifold have an intrinsic physical identity independently of the metric field?
In order to lay our cards on table with respect to these (rethorical) ques-
tions, we start from the latter in order to note an unfortunate ambiguity in
the use of the term ”spacetime points”: sometimes it refers to elements of
the mathematical structure that is the first conceptual ”layer” of the space-
time model (the manifold), sometimes it refers to the points interpreted as
physical events. To remedy this situation, we stipulate to use the term point-
events to refer to physical events and simply points to refer to elements of
the mathematical manifold. In this respect we just want to add that in the
mathematical literature about topological spaces, it is implicitly assumed
that their elements are already distinguished. Otherwise, one could not even
state the Hausdorff condition, let alone define mappings, homeomorphisms,
or active diffeomorphisms. It is well known, however, that the points of a
homogeneous space (as the manifold would be prior to the introduction of
the metric) cannot have any intrinsic individuality. As Hermann Weyl (1946)
put it:
There is no distinguishing objective property by which one could
tell apart one point from all others in a homogeneous space: at
this level, fixation of a point is possible only by a demonstrative
act as indicated by terms like “this” and “there.”
Quite aside from the phenomenological stance implicit in Weyl’s words, there
is only one way to individuate points at the mathematical level that we are
considering, namely by (arbitrary) coordinatization. By using coordinates,
we transfer the individuality of n-tuples of real numbers to the elements of
the topological set.
As to the first question above, we will have to limit ourselves to the
following remarks: although the metric tensor field, qua physical field, cannot
be regarded as the traditional empty container of other physical fields, we
believe that it has ontological priority over all other fields. This preeminence
has various reasons (Pauri, 1996), but the most important is that the metric
field tells all other fields how to move causally. In agreement also with the
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general-relativistic practice of not counting the gravitational energy induced
by the metric as a component of the total energy, we believe that physical
spacetime should be identified with the manifold endowed with its metric,
thereby leaving the task of representing matter to the stress-energy tensor.
In consonance with this choice, Stachel8 has provided a very enlighten-
ing analysis of the conceptual consequences of modern Leibniz equivalence.
Stachel stresses that asserting that g and D∗Ag represent one and the same
gravitational field implies that the mathematical individuation of the points of
the differentiable manifold by their coordinates has no physical content until
a metric tensor is specified. Stachel stresses that if g and D∗Ag must represent
the same gravitational field, they cannot be physically distinguished in any
way. Consequently, when we act on g with D∗A to create the drag-along field
D∗Ag, no element of physical significance can be left behind: in particular,
nothing that could identify a point x of the manifold as the same point of
spacetime for both g and D∗Ag. Instead, when x is mapped onto x
′ = DAx,
it brings over its identity, as specified by g′(x′) = g(x).
These remarks led Stachel to the important conclusion that vis a´ vis the
physical point-events, the metric plays in fact the role of individuating field.
More than that, even the topology of the underlying manifold cannot be
introduced independently of the specific form of the metric tensor, a cir-
cumstance that makes Earman and Norton’s choice of interpreting the mere
topological and differentiable manifold as spacetime (let alone substantival
spacetime) even more implausible. More precisely, Stachel suggested that
this individuating role should be implemented by four invariant functionals
of the metric, already considered by Komar (1955).
However, he did not follow up on such a suggestion, something that we
will do in the next section, with the aim of further clarifying the nature of
the physical point-events. We believe in fact that their status as the intrinsic
elements of physical spacetime needs further analysis,9 especially in view of
the questions of structural realism and spacetime substantivalism that we
raised before.
3.2 The dynamical individuation of point-events
3.2.1 Pure gravitational field without matter
It is well known that only some of the ten components of the metric are
physically essential: it seems then plausible to suppose that only this subset
can act as individuating field, and that the remaining components play a
8See Stachel (1980; 1986; 1993.)
9For a similar viewpoint, see Friedman (2001).
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different role.
Bergmann and Komar (1960) and Bergmann (1960; 1962; 1977) intro-
duced the notion of intrinsic invariant pseudo-coordinates already in 1960.
These authors noted that for a vacuum solution of the Einstein equations,
there are exactly four functionally independent scalars that can be written
using the lowest possible derivatives of the metric10. These are the four
Weyl scalars (the eigenvalues of the Weyl tensor), here written in Petrov’s
compressed notation,
w1 = Tr (gWgW ),
w2 = Tr (gW²W ),
w3 = Tr (gWgWgW ),
w4 = Tr (gWgW²W ), (1)
where g is the four -metric, W is the Weyl tensor, and ² is the Levi–Civita
totally antisymmetric tensor.
Bergmann and Komar then propose to build a set of intrinsic pseudo-
coordinates for the point–events of spacetime as four suitable functions of
the wT ,
Iˆ [A] = Iˆ [A][wT [g(x), ∂g(x)]], A = 0, 1, 2, 3. (2)
Indeed, under the non-restrictive hypothesis that no spacetime symmetries
are present - in an analysis of the physical individuation of points, we must
consider generic solutions of the Einstein equations rather than the null-
measure set of solutions with symmetries - the Iˆ [A] can be used to label the
point-events of spacetime, at least locally. Since they are scalars, the Iˆ [A] are
invariant under passive diffeomorphisms (therefore they do not define a coor-
dinate chart in the usual sense), and by construction they are also constant
under the drag-along of tensor fields induced by active diffeomorphisms.
At this stage, however, it is far from clear how to explicitly use these
intrinsic coordinates to solve the puzzles raised by the Hole Argument, espe-
cially in view of its connection with the Cauchy problem. For it is essential
to realize that the Hole Argument is inextricably entangled with the initial-
value problem of general relativity, although, strangely enough, it has never
been explicitly and systematically discussed in this context. The main rea-
son for this neglect is plausibly given by the fact that most authors have
10The fact that there are just four independent invariants for the vacuum gravitational
field is not a coincidence. On the contrary, it is crucial for the purpose of point individ-
uation and for the gauge-fixing procedure that we will propose. After all, recall that in
general spacetimes with matter there are 14 invariants of this kind!
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implicitly adopted the Lagrangian approach (or the manifold way), in which
the initial-value problem turns out to be intractable because of the non-
hyperbolic nature of Einstein’s equations. This is also the main reason why
we are obliged to turn to the Hamiltonian methods11.
Three circumstances make the recourse to the Hamiltonian formalism
especially propitious.
1. It is only within the Hamiltonian approach that we can separate the
gauge variables - which carry the descriptive arbitrariness of the theory
- from the Dirac observables, which are gauge invariant quantities and
are subject to hyperbolic (and therefore ”determinate” or ”causal” in
the customary sense) evolution equations.
2. In the context of the Hamiltonian formalism, we can resort to the
Bergmann and Komar’s theory of ”general coordinate group symme-
tries” (1972) to clarify the significance of active diffeomorphisms as
on-shell dynamical symmetries of the Einstein equations.
3. With respect to our main purpose of trying to understand the nature
of point-events in classical GR, it is only within the ADM Hamiltonian
formulation of GR that we can introduce a peculiar gauge-fixing that
can be invoked for their physical (dynamical) individuation12.
3.2.2 Pure gravitational field: the ADM slicing of spacetime and the canon-
ical reduction
The ADM (Arnowitt, Deser and Misner, 1962) Hamiltonian approach starts
with a slicing of the 4-dimensional manifoldM4 into constant-time hypersur-
faces Στ , indexed by the parameter time τ , each equipped with coordinates
σa (a = 1,2,3) and a three-metric 3g (in components 3gab). In order to obtain
the 4-geometry, we start at a point on Στ , and displace it infinitesimally in a
direction that is normal to Στ . The resulting change in τ can be written as dτ
= Ndτ , where N is the so-called lapse function. In a generic coordinate sys-
tem, such a displacement will also shift the spatial coordinates: σa(τ +dτ) =
σa(τ)+Nadτ , where Na is the shift vector. Then the interval between (τ, σa)
11It is not by chance that the modern treatment of the initial value problem within the
Lagrangian configurational approach (Friedrich and Rendall , 2000) must in fact mimic
the Hamiltonian methods.
12The individuation procedure outlined here is based on the technical results obtained
by Lusanna and Pauri (Lusanna and Pauri, 2003), see also Pauri and Vallisneri, (2002),
hereafter quoted as LP and PV, respectively.
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and (τ +dτ, σa+dσa) results: ds2 = N2dτ 2− 3gab(dσa+Nadτ)(dσb+N bdτ).
The configurational variables N , Na, 3gab together their 10 conjugate mo-
menta, index a 20-dimensional phase space13. Expressed (modulo surface
terms) in terms of the ADM variables, the Einstein-Hilbert action is a func-
tion of N , Na, 3gab and its first time derivative, or equivalently of N , N
a,
3gab and the extrinsic curvature
3Kab of the hyper-surface Στ , considered as
an embedded manifold.
Since the original Einstein’s equations are not hyperbolic, it turns out that
the canonical momenta are not all functionally independent, but satisfy four
conditions known as primary constraints. Other four, secondary constraints
arise when we require that the primary constraints be preserved through
evolution (the secondary constraints are called the superhamiltonian H0 ≈ 0,
and the supermomentum Ha ≈ 0, (a = 1, 2, 3) constraints, respectively). The
eight constraints are given as functions of the canonical variables that vanish
on the constraint surface14. The existence of such constraints imply that
that not all the points of the 20-dimensional phase space represent physically
meaningful states: rather, we are restricted to the constraint surface where
all the constraints are satisfied, i.e., to a 12-dimensional (20 - 8) surface
which, on the other hand, does not possess the geometrical structure of a
true phase space. When used as generators of canonical transformations, the
eight constraints map points on the constraint surface to points on the same
surface; these transformations are known as gauge transformations.
To obtain the correct dynamics for the constrained system, we need to
modify the Hamiltonian variational principle to enforce the constraints; we
do this by adding the primary constraint functions to the Hamiltonian, after
multiplying them by arbitrary functions (the Lagrange–Dirac multipliers).
If, following Dirac, we make the reasonable demand that the evolution of all
physical variables be unique - otherwise we would have real physical variables
that are indeterminate and therefore neither observable nor measurable -
then the points of the constraint surface lying on the same gauge orbit, i.e.
linked by gauge transformations, must describe the same physical state15.
Conversely, only the functions in phase space that are invariant with respect
to gauge transformations can describe physical quantities.
To eliminate this ambiguity and create a one-to-one mapping between
13Of course, all these variables are in fact fields.
14Technically, these functions are said to be weakly zero. Conversely, any weakly van-
ishing function is a linear combination of the weakly vanishing functions that define the
constraint surface.
15Actually in GR, there are further and subtler complications concerning the geometric
significance of the whole set of such transformations and the existence of geometrically-
inequivalent states (see LP and PV).
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points in the phase space and physical states, we must impose further con-
straints, known as gauge conditions or gauge-fixings. The gauge-fixings can
be implemented by arbitrary functions of the canonical variables, except that
they must define a reduced phase space that intersects each gauge orbit ex-
actly once (orbit conditions). The number of independent gauge-fixing must
be equal to the number of independent constraints (i.e. 8 in our case). The
canonical reduction proceeds by a cascade procedure: the gauge-fixings to
the super-hamiltonian and super-momentum come first (call it Γ4); then the
requirement of their time constancy fixes the gauges with respect to the pri-
mary constraints. Finally the requirement of time constancy for these latter
gauge-fixings determines the Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, the first level
of gauge-fixing gives rise to a complete gauge-fixing, say Γ8, and is sufficient
to remove all the gauge arbitrariness.
The Γ8 procedure reduces the original 20-dimensional phase space to a
reduced phase-space Ω4 having 4 degrees of freedom per point (12 - 8 gauge-
fixings). Abstractly, the reduced phase-space is the quotient of the constraint
surface by the 8-dimensional group of gauge transformations and represents
the space of variation of the true degrees of freedom of the theory. Ω4 inher-
its a symplectic structure (Dirac brackets) from the original Poisson brackets
and is a true phase-space coordinatized by four Dirac observables (two con-
figurational and two momentum variables): call such field observables qr, ps
(r,s = 1,2). These observables carry the physical content of the theory in
that they represent the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field
(recall that at this stage we are dealing with a pure gravitational field). Con-
cretely, for any complete gauge fixing Γ8, we get a Γ8-dependent copy of the
abstract Ω4 as a coordinatized realization of it in terms of Dirac observables.
Though the Dirac observables are gauge-invariant, their functional form in
terms of the original canonical variables depends upon the gauge, so that
such observables - a priori - are neither tensors nor invariant under DP . Yet,
off shell, barring sophisticated mathematical complications, any two copies
of Ω4 are diffeomorphic images of one-another. After the canonical reduc-
tion is performed, the theory is completely determined: each physical state
corresponds to one and only one set of canonical variables that satisfies the
constraints and the gauge conditions.
It is important to understand qualitatively the geometric meaning of the
eight infinitesimal off-shell Hamiltonian gauge transformations and thereby
the geometric significance of the related gauge-fixings. i) The transforma-
tions generated by the four primary constraints modify the lapse and shift
functions which, in turn, determine how densely the space-like hyper-surfaces
Στ are distributed in spacetime and also the gravito-magnetism conventions;
ii) the transformations generated by the three super-momentum constraints
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induce a transition on Στ from a given 3-coordinate system to another; iii)
the transformation generated by the super-hamiltonian constraint induces a
transition from a given a-priori ”form” of the 3+1 splitting ofM4 to another
one, by operating deformations of the space-like hyper-surfaces in the normal
direction. The manifest effect of the related gauge-fixings emerges only at
the end of the canonical reduction and after the solution of the Einstein-
Hamilton equations has been worked out (i.e., on shell), since the role of the
gauge-fixings is essentially that of choosing the functional form in which all
the gauge variables depend upon the Dirac observables. Therefore, it is only
after the initial conditions for the Dirac observables have been arbitrarily se-
lected on a Cauchy surface that the whole four-dimensional chrono-geometry,
(including - unlike the special relativistic case - all the relativistic ”conven-
tions”) is dynamically determined.
Two important points must be stressed.
First, before the gauge-fixings are implemented, in order to carry out the
canonical reduction explicitly, we have to perform a basic canonical trans-
formation, the so-called Shanmugadhasan transformation, bringing from the
original canonical variables to a new basis including the Dirac observables in
a canonical subset in such a way that they have zero P.B. with all the other
variables16. Now, the Shanmugadhasan transformation is highly non-local
in the metric and curvature variables: even though, at the end, for any τ ,
the Dirac observables are fields indexed by the coordinate point σa, they are
in fact highly non-local functionals of the metric and the curvature over the
whole surface Στ . We can write, symbolically :
qr(τ, ~σ) = F[Στ ]r[(τ, ~σ)| 3gab(τ, ~σ), 3picd(τ, ~σ)]
ps(τ, ~σ) = G[Στ ]s[(τ, ~σ)| 3gab(τ, ~σ), 3picd(τ, ~σ)], r, s = 1, 2. (3)
Second: since the original canonical Hamiltonian in terms of the ADM
variables is zero, it happens to be written solely in terms of the eight con-
straints and Lagrangian multipliers. This means, however, that this Hamil-
tonian generates purely harmless gauge transformations connecting different
admissible spacetime 3+1 splittings, so that it cannot engender any real
temporal change (in this connection see Earman (2002); Belot and Earman
(1999, 2001)). The crucial point, however, is that, in the case of the globally-
hyperbolic non-compact spacetimes, defined by suitable boundary conditions
16In practice, this transformation requires the solution of the super-hamiltonian con-
straint. Even if so far this result has proved elusive, the relevant properties of the new
basis can nevertheless be worked out (De Pietri et al. (2002)).
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and asymptotically flat at spatial infinity, just as those we are dealing with in
this work17, internal mathematical consistency entails that the generator of
temporal evolution is the so-called weak ADM energy, which is obtained by
adding the so-called De-Witt boundary surface term to the canonical Hamil-
tonian18. Indeed, this quantity does generate real temporal modifications of
the canonical variables. Thus, the final Einstein-Hamilton-Dirac equations
for the Dirac observables are
q˙r = {qr, HADM}∗, p˙s = {ps, HADM}∗, r, s = 1, 2, (4)
where HADM is intended as the restriction of the ADM weak energy to Ω4
and where the {·, ·}∗ are the Dirac brackets.
3.2.3 Pure gravitational field: the metrical fingerprint
We can now turn to briefly illustrate the process of dynamical individuation
of point-events. First of all we exploit a technical result by Bergmann and
Komar (Bergmann and Komar, 1960), namely the fact that the four Weyl
scalar invariants (1), once re-expressed in terms of the ADM variables, turn
out to be independent of the lapse function N and the shift vector Na. This
means that the intrinsic pseudo-coordinates are in fact functionals of the
variables 3gab and
3Kab only . Then we write
Iˆ [A][wT (g, ∂g)] ≡ Zˆ [A][wT (3g, 3pi)], A = 0, 1, 2, 3; (5)
and select a completely arbitrary coordinate system σA ≡ [τ, σa] adapted to
the Στ surfaces. Finally we apply the peculiar gauge fixing Γ4 defined by
χA ≡ σA − Zˆ [A][wT [(3g(σB), 3pi(σD)]] ≈ 0, A = 0, 1, 2, 3, (6)
to the super-hamiltonian (A = 0) and the super-momentum (A = 1,2,3)
constraints. This is indeed a good gauge-fixing provided that the functions
Zˆ [A] are chosen to satisfy the fundamental orbit conditions {Zˆ [A],HB} 6=
0, (A,B = 0, 1, 2, 3), which ensure the independence of the χA and carry
information about the Lorentz signature. At the end of the gauge-fixing
procedure Γ8, the effect is that the values (i.e. the evolution throughout
the mathematical spacetime M4) of the Dirac observables, whose depen-
dence on space (and on parameter time) is indexed by the chosen coordinates
17These spacetimes are known as Christodoulou-Klainermann spacetimes,
(Christodoulou and Klainerman , 1993).
18The ADM energy is a Noether constant of motion representing the total mass of the
”universe”, just one among the ten asymptotic Poincare´ ”charges”. The mathematical
background of this result can be found in Lusanna (2001) and references therein.
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σA, reproduces precisely the σA as the Bergmann–Komar intrinsic pseudo-
coordinates, in the chosen gauge Γ8:
σA = Zˆ [A][wT (q
r(σB), ps(σ
C)|Γ8)], A = 0, 1, 2, 3; (7)
where the notation wT (q, p|Γ8) represents the functional form that the Weyl
scalars wT assume in the chosen gauge.
In the language of constraint theory, after the canonical reduction is per-
formed - and only for the solutions of the equations of motion - (7) becomes
a strong relation19. Such a strong relation is in fact an identity with re-
spect to the σA, and amounts to a ”definition” of the coordinates σA as four
scalars providing a physical individuation of any point–event, in the gauge-
fixed coordinate system, in terms of the true dynamical gravitational degrees
of freedom. The price that we have paid for this achievement is of course
that we have broken general covariance!
At first, this result may sound surprising: qua diffeomorphism-invariant
quantities, the intrinsic pseudo- coordinates can be forced within a coordinate
system corresponding to any experimental arrangement. From the Hamilto-
nian viewpoint, however, they are necessarily gauge-dependent functionals20.
Note that the virtue of this elaborate construction does not depend on the
selection of a set of physically preferred coordinates, because by modifying the
functions I [A] of (2) we have the possibility of implementing any coordinate
transformation. So diffeomorphism-invariance reappears under a different
suit: we find exactly the same functional freedom of DP in the functional
freedom of the choice of the pseudo-coordinates Z [A] (i.e., of the gauge fixing
Γ4). Thus, it turns out that, on shell, at the Hamiltonian as well as the
Lagrangian level, gauge fixing is clearly synonymous with the selection of
manifold coordinates (recall the geometric meaning of the off shell gauge
transformations). Yet, we can now claim that any coordinatization of the
manifold can be seen as embodying the physical individuation of points,
because it can be implemented - locally at least - as the Komar–Bergmann
intrinsic pseudo-coordinates after we choose the correct Z [A] and we select
the proper gauge.
19This means that the relation is expressed by functions which not only vanish on
the constraint surface but also have all vanishing derivatives in directions normal to the
constraint surface.
20It is not known so far whether the 16 canonical variables of the Shanmugadhasan basis
- which include the Dirac observables - could be replaced by 16 diffeomorphism-invariant
quantities - which, in particular - would include tensorial Dirac observables. This is an
important question which however could be answered in the positive if a main conjecture
advanced in LP would turn out to be true. In that case we would have a fully objective
(tensor-covariant) dynamical individuation of point-events.
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The effect of the active diffeomorphisms DA of M4 has been that of
disclosing the Leibniz equivalence underlying the Hole Argument within the
Lagrangian description. By now it should be clear that the Hole Argument
has nothing to do with an alleged indeterminism of GR as a dynamical
theory. Once we choose a complete gauge-fixing Γ8 and we assign the initial
values for such observables on a Cauchy surface Στ0 , no such indeterminism
appears to affect the Hamiltonian-Dirac observables .
This result, however, entails that one crucial point has still to be clar-
ified. On the one hand, at the Lagrangian level, passive diffeomorphisms
DP are devoid of any physical significance, while active diffeomorphisms DA
differing from the identity within the Hole relate distinct Leibniz-equivalent
solutions that have the same initial Cauchy conditions, a fact that allegedly
could have had physical implications. On the other hand, at the Hamiltonian
level, different solutions to the (deterministic) Einstein-Hamilton equations
for the Dirac observables, corresponding to the same initial conditions on
a Στ0 Cauchy surface, are related by harmless gauge-transformations which
are indeed passive by definition. Moreover, we have stated that a complete
gauge-fixing is equivalent to the choice of a spatiotemporally extended phys-
ical laboratory 21. It is clear that for a full understanding of the role played
by active diffeomorphisms in the Hole Argument, it is necessary that they be
also interpretable in some way as the manifold-way counterparts of suitable
Hamiltonian gauge transformations. Here, we can only limit ourselves to
state that this is actually possible by resorting to a nearly forgotten paper
by Bergmann and Komar’s (1972) about the general coordinate-group sym-
metries of Einstein equations. In fact, it turns out (see LP and PV) that
active diffeomorphisms can be viewed as passive transformations only on the
conjunction of the spacetime manifold and the function space of the metric
fields. This entails that solutions of Einstein’s equations that within the Hole
differ by an active transformation on manifold points, at the Hamiltonian
level - the proper one for a correct treatment of the initial value problem -
are simply solutions differing by a harmless gauge transformation.
In a word, since outside and inside the Hole the gauge must be completely
21Recall that canonical reduction, which creates the distinction between gauge-
dependent quantities and Dirac observables, is made off shell, i.e., before solving the
equations of motion. On the other hand, the metric and the extrinsic curvature (and
thereby also the complete definition of the Στ embedding) are not completely defined
until the Einstein-Hamilton equations are solved and the contribution of the Dirac ob-
servables calculated. Given the geometrical meaning of the gauge fixings, at this stage
Γ8 includes a choice of the conventions about global simultaneity and gravito-magnetism,
together with the implicit definition of two global congruences of time-like observers and
an atlas of coordinate charts on the spacetime manifold : in particular, within the Hole
(see LP).
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fixed before solving the initial-value problem and therefore find the solution
of the field equation, it makes little sense to apply active diffeomorphisms
to an already generated solution to obtain an allegedly “different” spacetime.
Conversely, it should be possible to generate these “different” solutions by
appropriate choices of the initial gauge fixing (the functions Zˆ [A]).
3.2.4 Gravitational field cum matter and the spacetime holistic texture
In conclusion, what is relevant to our discussion is that there is a peculiar
class of gauge-fixings, (6), that is instrumental both to the solution of the
Cauchy problem and to the physical individuation of spacetime point-events.
We propose to call this gauge the intrinsic individuating gauge. As we have
seen above, each of the point–events of spacetime is endowed with its own
physical individuation (the right metrical fingerprint!) as the value of the
four scalar functionals of the Dirac observables (just four!), which describe
the dynamical degrees of freedom of the gravitational field. It is important to
stress that, due to the independence of the pseudo-coordinates from the lapse
and shift functions, these degrees of freedom are inextricably entangled with
the structure of the whole 3-metric and 3-curvature in a way that is strongly
gauge dependent but does not involve geometrical elements external to the
Cauchy surface. This result appears as an instantiation of three-dimensional
holism. Yet, since (7) is four-dimensional and includes the temporal gauge
(fixed by the scalar Z [0]), as soon as the Einstein-Hamilton equations are
solved and the evolution in τ of the Dirac observables fully determined, a
peculiar instantiation of four-dimensional stratified holism is recovered. At
this point we could even say that the existence of physical point-events in
our models of general relativity appears to be synonymous with the exis-
tence of the Dirac observables for the gravitational field, and advance the
ontological claim that - physically - Einstein’s vacuum spacetime is literally
identifiable with the autonomous degrees of freedom of such structural field,
while the specific (gauge-dependent) functional form of the intrinsic pseudo-
coordinates map specifically such coordinates into the manifold’s points. The
intrinsic gravitational degrees of freedom are - as it were - fully absorbed in
the individuation of point-events. Thus, in this way, point-events also keep a
special kind of intrinsic properties22.
On the other hand, with respect to the physical interpretation of all the
variables implied in the Hamiltonian approach to GTR, it can be argued
(see LP) that while the Dirac observables essentially describe generalized
22Of course, once Einstein’s equations have been solved, the metric tensor and all of its
derived quantities, in particular the light-cones structure, can be re-expressed in terms of
Dirac observables in a gauge-fixed functional form.
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tidal effects of the gravitational field, the gauge variables, considered off
shell, embody generalized inertial effects connected to the definition of the
laboratory in which measurements take place, i.e. in which the gravitational
phenomena manifestly appear.
Let us now briefly look at the most general case of ADM models of GR
with matter fields, taking proper notice of the fact that we are still work-
ing with globally hyperbolic pseudo-Riemannian 4-manifolds M4 which are
asymptotically flat at spatial infinity. The introduction of matter has the
effect of modifying the Riemann and Weyl tensors, namely the curvature of
the 4-dimensional substratum, and to allow a measure of the gravitational
field in a geometric way (for instance through effects like the geodesic devia-
tion equation). In the presence of matter, we have Dirac observables for the
gravitational field and Dirac observables for the matter fields. As it is to be
expected, however, even the functional form of gravitational observables is
modified (relative to the vacuum case) by the presence of matter. Since the
gravitational Dirac observables will still provide the individuating fields for
point-events according to the conceptual procedure presented in this paper,
matter will come to influence the very physical individuation of spacetime
point-events. Yet, the ontological conclusions reached above are not altered
at all.
Finally, even in the case with matter, time evolution is still ruled by the
weak ADM energy rather than by the simple canonical Hamiltonian. There-
fore, the temporal variation corresponds to a real change and not merely
to a harmless gauge transformation as in other models of GR. These lat-
ter include, for instance, the spatially compact spacetime without boundary
(or simply closed models) which are exploited by Earman in his Thoroughly
Modern McTaggart (2002). We acknowledge that the validity of our results
is restricted to the class of models of GR we worked with. Yet, we are in-
terested in a instantiation of a question of principle, and we want to argue
that there is a basic class of models of GR embodying both a real notion of
temporal change and a new structuralistic and holistic view of spacetime.
3.2.5 The empirical side: the closure of the epistemic circuit
As shown in PL and LP, in the absence of a dynamical theory of measurement,
the epistemic circuit of GR can be approximately closed via an experimental
three-steps procedure that, starting from concrete radar measurements and
using test-objects, ends up in a complete and empirically coherent intrinsic
individuating gauge-fixing.
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4 Developing hints for the Quantum Gravity
Program
Let us close our analysis with some hints for the quantum gravity pro-
gram that are suggested by the above results. As is well-known, there
are today two inequivalent approaches: i) the perturbative background-
dependent string formulation, on a Fock space containing elementary parti-
cles; ii) the non-perturbative background-independent loop quantum gravity
formulation, based on the non-Fock so-called polymer Hilbert space. The
latter approach still fails to accommodate elementary particles, although
Ashtekar has advanced some suggestions to define a coarse-grained structure
as a bridge between standard coherent states in Fock space and some shadow
states of the discrete quantum geometry associated to polymer Hilbert space.
Now, let us point out that (7) is a numerical identity that has an in-built
non-commutative structure, deriving from the Dirac–Poisson structure on its
right-hand side. The individuation procedure we have proposed transfers, as
it were, the non-commutative Poisson-Dirac structure of the Dirac observ-
ables onto the individuated point-events, even if, of course, the coordinates
on the l.h.s. of the identity (7) are c-numbers quantities. One could guess
that such a feature might deserve some attention in view of quantization, for
instance by maintaining that the identity (7) could still play some role at the
quantum level. We will assume here for the sake of argument that the main
conjecture advanced by Lusanna and Pauri (see footnote 20) is verified, so
that all the quantities we consider are manifestly covariant.
Let us first lay down some qualitative premises concerning the status of
Minkowski spacetime in relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT): call it
micro-spacetime (see Pauri (2000)). Such a status is indeed quite peculiar.
Since it is introduced into the theory through the group-theoretical require-
ment of the relativistic invariance of the statistical results of measurements
with respect to the choice of macroscopic reference frames, the micro space-
time is therefore anchored to the macroscopic, medium-seized objects that
asymptotically define the experimental conditions in the laboratory.23 Thus,
the spatiotemporal properties of the micro Minkowski manifold, including its
basic causal structure, are, as it were, projected onto it from outside.
In classical field theories spacetime points play the role of individuals and
we have seen how point-events can be individuated dynamically in a richer
23It is just in this asymptotic sense that a physical meaning is attributed to the classical
spatiotemporal coordinates upon which the quantum fields’ operators depend as parame-
ters.
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and holistic way. No such possibility, however, is consistently left open in a
non-metaphorical way in RQFT. From this point of view, Minkowski’s micro-
spacetime in RQFT is in a worse position than classical general relativistic
spacetime: it lacks the existence of Riemannian intrinsic pseudo-coordinates,
as well as of all the non-dynamical (better, operational and pragmatic) addi-
tional macroscopic elements that are used for the individuation of its points,
like rigid rods and clocks in rigid and non-accelerated motion, or various com-
binations of genidentical world-lines of free test particles, light rays, clocks,
and other test devices.
Summarizing, Minkowski’s micro-spacetime seems to be essentially func-
tioning like an instrumental but external translator of the symbolic structure
of quantum theory into the causal language of the macroscopic, irreversible
traces constituting the experimental findings within macro-spacetime. Such
an external translator should be regarded as an epistemic precondition for the
formulation of RQFT in the sense of Bohr, independently of one’s attitude
towards the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.
Thus, barring macroscopic Schro¨dinger’s cat-like states of the would-be
quantum spacetime, any conceivable formulation of a quantum theory of
gravity would have to respect, at the operational level, the epistemic priority
of a classical spatiotemporal continuum. In fact, the possibility of referring
directly to ”the quantum structure of spacetime” faces at the very least a
serious conceptual difficulty, concerning the localization of the gravitational
field: what does it mean to talk about the values of the gravitational field at a
point if the metric field itself is subject to quantum fluctuations? How could
we identify point-events? In this case, we could no longer tell whether the
separation between two points is space-like, null or time-like since quantum
fluctuation of the metric could exchange past and future.
Accordingly, in order to give physical and operational meaning to the spa-
tiotemporal language, we would need some sort of instrumental background,
mathematically represented by a manifold structure, which, at the quantum
level, should play more or less the role of a Wittgensteinian staircase. It is
likely, therefore, that in order to attribute meaning to the individuality of
points at some spatiotemporal scale - so as to build the basic structure of
standard quantum theory - one should split, as it were, the individuation
procedure of point-events from the true quantum properties, i.e., from the
fluctuations of the gravitational field and the micro-causal structure. Our
canonical analysis tends to prefigure a new approach to quantization, having
in view a Fock space formulation which, unlike the loop quantum gravity,
could even lead to a background-independent incorporation of the standard
model of elementary particles (provided the Cauchy surfaces admit Fourier
transforms). For a quantization program respecting relativistic causality, two
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options seem available:
1) Our individuation procedure suggests to quantize only the gravitational
Dirac observables (assumed now as scalars in force of the main conjecture
(LP)) of each Hamiltonian gauge, as well as all the matter Dirac observ-
ables, and than exploit the weak ADM energy of that gauge as Hamiltonian
for the functional Schro¨dinger equation (of course there might be ordering
problems). This quantization would yield as many Hilbert spaces as gauge-
fixings, which would likely be grouped in unitary equivalence classes (we
leave aside the question of what could be the meaning of inequivalent classes,
were there any). In each Hilbert space the Dirac quantum operators would
be distribution-valued quantum fields on a mathematical micro spacetime
parametrized by the 4-coordinates (τ , ~σ) associated to the chosen gauge.
Strictly speaking, due to the non-commutativity of the operators ZA associ-
ated to the classical constraint σA− ZˆA ≈ 0 defining that gauge, there would
be no spacetime manifold of point-events to be mathematically identified by
one coordinate chart over the micro-spacetime but only a gauge-dependent
non-commutative structure, which is likely to lack any underlying topolog-
ical structure. However, for each Hilbert space, a coarse-grained spacetime
of point-events (Σ¯)A(τ, ~σ), superimposed on the mathematical manifoldM4,
might be associated to each solution of the functional Schro¨dinger equation,
via the expectation values of the operators ZˆA:
(Σ¯)A(τ, ~σ) ≡ 〈Ψ
∣∣∣ZˆAΓ [Qr(τ, ~σ),Pa(τ, ~σ)]∣∣∣Ψ〉, A = 0, 1, 2, 3; r, s = 1, 2; (8)
where Qr(τ, ~σ) and Ps(τ, ~σ) are now Dirac scalar field operators.
Let us stress that, by means of (7), the non-locality of the classical in-
dividuation of point-events would be directly transferred to the basis of the
ordinary, quantum non-locality. Also, one could evaluate in principle the
expectation values of the operators corresponding to the lapse and shift
functions of that gauge. Since we are considering a quantization of the 3-
geometry (like in loop quantum gravity), evaluating the expectation values
of the quantum 3-metric and the quantum lapse and shift functions could
permit to reconstruct a coarse-grained foliation with coarse-grained so-called
WSW hyper-surfaces24.
2) In order to avoid inequivalent Hilbert spaces, we could quantize before
adding any gauge-fixing (i.e. independently of the choice of the 4-coordinates
and the physical individuation of point-events). For example, using the fol-
lowing rule of quantization, which complies with relativistic causality: in a
24This foliation is called the Wigner-Sen-Witten foliation due to its properties at spatial
infinity (see Lusanna (2001)).
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given canonical basis of themain conjecture, quantize the two pairs of (scalar)
gravitational Dirac observables and matter Dirac observables, but leave the 8
gauge variables as c-number classical fields. Like in Schro¨dinger’s theory with
a time-dependent Hamiltonian, the momenta conjugate to the gauge vari-
ables would be represented by functional derivatives. Assuming that in the
chosen canonical basis, 7 among the eight constraints be gauge momenta, we
would thereby get 7 Schro¨dinger equations. Then, as suggested in (LP), both
the super-Hamiltonian and the weak ADM energy would become operators
and, if an ordering existed such that the 8 ”quantum constraints” satisfied
a closed algebra of the form [φˆα, φˆβ] = Cˆαβγ φˆγ and [EˆADM , φˆα] = Bˆαβ φˆβ,
(α, β, γ = 1, ..., 8), (with the quantum structure functions Cˆαβγ, Bˆαβ tending
to the classical counterparts for h¯ 7→ 0), we might quantize by imposing 9 in-
tegrable coupled functional Schro¨dinger equations, with the associated usual
scalar product 〈Ψ
∣∣∣Ψ〉 being independent of τ and of the gauge variables.
Again, we would have a mathematical micro spacetime and a coarse-
grained spacetime of ”point-events”. At this point, by going to coherent
states, we could try to recover classical gravitational fields. The 3-geometry
(volumes, areas, lengths) would be quantized, perhaps in a way that agrees
with the results of loop quantum gravity.
It is important to stress that, according to both suggestions, only the
Dirac observables would be quantized. The upshot is that fluctuations in
the gravitational field (better, in the Dirac observables) would entail fluc-
tuations of the point texture that lends itself to the basic spacetime scheme
of standard RQFT: such fluctuating texture, however, could be recovered
as a coarse-grained structure. This would induce fluctuations in the coarse-
grained metric relations, and thereby in the causal structure, both of which
would tend to disappear in a semi-classical approximation. Such a situation
should be conceptually tolerable, and even philosophically appealing, espe-
cially if compared with the impossibility of defining a causal structure within
all of the attempts grounded upon a quantization of the full 4-geometry. In
this connection, it would be interesting to see whether the fluctuations of
the point-events metrical texture could have any relevance to the macro-
objectification issue of quantum theory (see Ka´rolyha´zy et.al (1985), and
Penrose (1985)).
Finally, in spacetimes with matter, this procedure would entail quantizing
the generalized tidal effects and the action-at-a-distance potentials between
matter elements, but not the inertial aspects of the gravitational field. As
we have seen, the latter aspects are connected with gauge variables whose
variations reproduce all the possible viewpoints of local accelerated time-
like observers. Quantizing also the gauge variables would be tantamount to
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quantizing the metric together with the passive observers and their reference
frames, a fact that is empirically meaningless25.
5 Structural spacetime realism
The discussion in the previous sections is substantially grounded upon the
fact that GTR is a gauge theory. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992) gave a
very general definition of gauge theories:
These are theories in which the physical system being dealt with is described
by more variables than there are physically independent degrees of freedom.
The physically meaningful degrees of freedom then re-emerge as being those
invariant under a transformation connecting the variables (gauge transfor-
mation). Thus, one introduces extra variables to make the description more
transparent, and brings in at the same time a gauge symmetry to extract
the physically relevant content.
The relevant fact is that, while from the point of view of the constrained
Hamiltonian mathematical formalism general relativity is a gauge theory like
any other (e.g., electromagnetism and Yang-Mills theories), from the physical
point of view it is radically different. For, in addition to creating the distinc-
tion between what is observable and what is not, the gauge freedom of GR
is unavoidably entangled with the constitution of the very stage, space–time,
where the play of physics is enacted: a stage, however, which also takes an
active part in the play. In other words, the gauge mechanism has the dual
role of making the dynamics unique (as in all gauge theories), and of fix-
ing the spatio-temporal, dynamical background. It is only after a complete
gauge-fixing (i.e. after the individuation of a well defined physical labora-
tory), and after having found the solution of Einstein’s equations, that the
mathematical manifold M4 gets a physical individuation.
Unlike theories such as electromagnetism (or even Yang-Mills), in GR
we cannot rely from the beginning on empirically validated, gauge-invariant
dynamical equations for the local fields. In order to get equations for local
fields we must pay the price of Einstein’s general covariance which, by ruling
out any background structure at the outset, conceals at the same time the
intrinsic properties of point-events. With reference to the definition of Hen-
neaux and Teitelboim, we could say, therefore, that the introduction of extra
25Of course, such observers have nothing to do with dynamical measuring objects, which
should be realized in terms of the Dirac observables of matter.
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variables does make indeed the mathematical description of general relativity
more transparent, but it also makes its physical interpretation more obscure
and intriguing, at least prima facie. Actually, our analysis discloses a deeper
distinction of philosophical import. For it highlights a peculiar ontological
and functional split of the metric tensor that can be briefly described as fol-
lows. On the one hand, the Dirac observables holistically specify the ontic
structure of spacetime. On the other, we have seen that the gauge variables
specify, as it were, the in-built epistemic component of the metric structure.
Actually, in completing the structural properties of the general-relativistic
spacetime, they play a multiple role: first of all, their fixing is necessary to
solve Einstein’s equations and to reconstruct the four-dimensional chrono-
geometry emerging from the Dirac observables : they are essential to get a
manifestly covariant and local metric field as a ten dimensional tensor (the
transparency of Henneaux and Teitelboim); but their fixing is also necessary
to allow empirical access to the theory through the definition of a spatio-
temporal laboratory.
The isolation of the superfluous structure hidden behind Leibniz equiv-
alence, which surfaces in the physical individuation of point-events, renders
even more glaring the ontological diversity and prominence of the gravita-
tional field with respect to all other fields, as well as the difficulty of rec-
onciling the nature of the gravitational field with the standard approach of
theories based on a background spacetime (to wit, string theory and pertur-
bative quantum gravity in general). Any attempt at linearizing such theories
unavoidably leads to looking at gravity from the perspective of a spin-2 theory
in which the graviton stands on the same ontological level of other quanta: in
the standard approach of background-dependent theories of gravity, photons,
gluons and gravitons all live on the stage on an equal footing.
From the point of view gained in this paper, however, non-linear gravitons
are at the same time both the stage and the actors within the causal play of
photons, gluons, as well as of other ”material characters” like electrons and
quarks.
We can, therefore, say that general covariance represents the horizon of a
priori possibilities for the physical constitution of the spacetime, possibilities
that must be actualized within any given solution of the dynamical equations.
We believe in conclusion that these results cast some light over the in-
trinsic structure of the general relativistic spacetime that had disappeared
behind Leibniz equivalence. While Leibniz could exploit the principle of suf-
ficient reason since for him space was uniform, in GR the upshot is that
space (spacetime) is not uniform at all and shows a rich structure. In a way,
in the context of GR, Leibniz equivalence ends up hiding the very nature of
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spacetime, instead of disclosing it.
5.1 The nature of point-events and the overcoming of
the substantivalism/relationism debate
In 1972, Bergmann and Komar wrote (1972):
[...] in general relativity the identity of a world point is not preserved under
the theory’s widest invariance group. This assertion forms the basis for the
conjecture that some physical theory of the future may teach us how to dis-
pense with world points as the ultimate constituents of spacetime altogether.
Indeed, would it be possible to build a fundamental theory that is grounded in
the reduced phase space parametrized by the Dirac observables? This would
be an abstract and highly non-local theory of classical gravitation but, trans-
parency aside, it would lack all the epistemic machinery (the gauge freedom)
which is indispensable for the application of the theory. Therefore, we see
that, even in the context of classical gravitational theory, the spatio-temporal
continuum is an epistemic precondition playing a role which is not too dis-
similar from that enacted by Minkowsky micro-spacetime in RQFT. We find
here much more than a clear instantiation of the relationship between canon-
ical structure and locality that pervades contemporary theoretical physics
throughout.
Can this basic freedom in the choice of the local realizations be equated
with a “taking away from space and time the last remnant of physical ob-
jectivity,” as Einstein suggested? We believe that, discounting Einstein’s
“spatial obsession” with realism as locality (and separability), a significant
kind of spatio-temporal objectivity survives. It is true that - if the main con-
jecture of LP is not verified - the functional form of the Dirac observables in
terms of the spatio-temporal coordinates depends upon the particular choice
of the latter (or, equivalently, of the gauge); yet, there is anyway no a-priori
physical individuation of the manifold points independently of the metric
field, so we cannot say that the individuation procedures corresponding to
different gauges individuate different point-events. Given the conventional
nature of the primary mathematical individuation of manifold points through
n-tuples of real numbers, we could say instead that the real point-events are
constituted by the non-local values of gravitational degrees of freedom, while
the underlying point structure of the mathematical manifold may be changed
at will. A really different physical individuation should only be attributed
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to different initial conditions for the Dirac observables, (i.e., to a different
”universe”).
Taking into account our results as a whole, we want to spend a few words
about their implications for the traditional debate on the absolutist/relationist
dichotomy as well as for the issues surrounding structural realism in general.
First of all, let us recall that, in remarkable diversity with respect to the
traditional historical presentation of Newton’s absolutism vis a´ vis Leibniz’s
relationism, Newton had a much deeper understanding of the nature of space
and time. In a well-known passage of De Gravitatione (see Hall and Hall
(1962)), he expounds what could be defined a structuralist view of space and
time. He writes:
Perhaps now it is maybe expected that I should define extension as substance
or accident or else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own manner
of existence which fits neither substance nor accidents [. . . ] the parts of space
derive their character from their positions, so that if any two could change
their positions, they would change their character at the same time and each
would be converted numerically into the other qua individuals. The parts
of duration and space are only understood to be the same as they really
are because of their mutual order and positions (propter solum ordinem et
positiones inter se); nor do they have any other principle of individuation
besides this order and position which consequently cannot be altered.
We have just disclosed the fact that the points of general-relativistic
spacetimes, quite unlike the points of the homogeneous Newtonian space,
are endowed with a remarkably rich non-point-like and holistic structure fur-
nished by the metric field. Therefore, the general-relativistic metric field itself
or, better, its independent degrees of freedom, have the capacity of charac-
terizing the ”mutual order and positions” of points dynamically, and in fact
much more than this, since such mutual order is altered by the presence of
matter.
In conclusion, we agree with Earman and Norton that the Hole Argu-
ment is a decisive blow against strict manifold substantivalism. However,
the isolation of the intrinsic structure hidden behind Leibniz equivalence -
leading to our point-structuralism - does not support the standard relation-
ist view either. As a matter of fact, by referring to Earman’s third criterion
(R3) for relationism (see (Earman , 1989, p. 14)): ”No irreducible, monadic,
spatiotemporal properties, like ’is located at spacetime point p’ appears in
a correct analysis of the spatiotemporal idiom”, we observe as follows: if by
’spacetime point’ we mean our physically individuated point-events instead
of the naked manifold’s point, then - because of the autonomous existence
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of the intrinsic degrees of freedom of the gravitational field (an essential in-
gredient of GR) - the above mentioned spatiotemporal property should be
admitted in our spatiotemporal idiom.
Indeed, a new kind of holistic and structuralist conception of spacetime
emerges from our analysis, including elements common to the tradition of
both substantivalism (spacetime has an autonomous existence independently
of other bodies or matter fields) and relationism (the physical meaning of
spacetime depends upon the relations between bodies or, in modern lan-
guage, the specific reality of spacetime depends (also) upon the (matter)
fields it contains). Indeed, even though the metric field does not embody
the traditional notion of substance (rather than being wholly present, it has
”temporal parts”), it exists and plays a role for the individuation of point-
events. On the other hand, each point-event itself, though holistically indi-
viduated by the metric field, has - to paraphrase Newton - ”its own manner
of existence”, since it ”is” the ”values” of the intrinsic degrees of freedom
of the gravitational field. Finally, in presence of matter, such values become
dependent also on the values of the Dirac observables of matter fields.
These remarks show how the structural texture of spacetime in classical
GR does not force us to abandon the typical entity realist attitude toward
both the metric field and its points. As our case study seems to indicate, we
must reject the ontic structural realist claim that (the metrical) relations can
exist without their relata (the points). At the same time, we can distance
ourself from the epistemic structural realist’s prudence in denying existence to
entities (in our case, point-events): despite their holistic texture, the identity
of point-events is sufficiently well characterized by the distinct values of the
Dirac observable they exemplify. In a word, we can use structural realism
to defend both (i) a moderate form of theory realism about the approximate
truth of Einstein’s field equations (within the limits fixed by their domain of
application) and (ii) a full blown realism about spacetime in GR. As far as QG
is concerned, the fluctuations of the Dirac observables do not eliminate the
structuralist and holistic nature of the coarse-grained texture of ”quantum
spacetime”. However, it would be difficult to claim that some kind of intrinsic
individuality survives for ”point-events”.
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